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Abstract
Can institutional reforms increase trust? Law enforcement is a government
institution that people interact with regularly, especially their local police departments. In
communities that experience officer-involved shootings of civilians, trust in the police is
low. In an effort to increase trust, advocates often propose law enforcement review
boards that can independently investigate complaints against officers and make
recommendations to law enforcement agencies to improve relations with the public. To
determine whether review boards truly repair trust, I conduct interviews with activists in
four cities across the US, and field a 230+ respondent survey experiment to assess the
effects of review boards on public perceptions of trust and efficacy. I find that while law
enforcement review boards increase the likelihood of reporting experiencing excessive
force, they do not affect trust in government or the police, and in some cases may actually
decrease perceptions of governmental efficacy.
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Introduction
Institutions of government are among the most significant influences of trust. Other
influences include economic situations, policy decisions, and individual’s opinions of political
leaders. Over the last fifty years, political trust has consistently declined, and proposed solutions
to rebuild trust in a community distrustful of government are difficult. Can institutional reform
be used to increase trust in government?
One of the most visible institutions of government is law enforcement; when trust in
community-police relations has deteriorated, it is up to the government to increase trust in the
eyes of the public. Law enforcement review boards are common responses to reintroduce trust.
This study begins here: public oversight institutions are offered as means to repair trust in
communities that do not trust the police by democratizing the system for victims of officer
misconduct to make complaints. For those who utilize the review boards, the review board
provides a conduit for them to receive justice for those complaints. Public oversight of the police
helps to rebuild depleted trust in people who do not trust the government, by encouraging people
who have been wronged by the police to make an official complaint and guarantee that they will
receive an independent investigation of their complaints against officers.
Trust in local government is consistently higher than state and federal government,
although its levels are by no means steadfast or consistent throughout the population. A
November 2014 poll by the Pew Research Center showed 40% of respondents believe they can
trust local government to do what’s right just about always or most of the time, and 46% said
they believe they can trust local government only some of the time (Pew, 2014). In the realm of
local politics, the majority of many people’s contact with the government comes in the form of
the local police department. The police represent local government and “the system” at large, and
1

practices of the police affect how many people view and interact with the local government.
Often, local police officers are the first and most consistent encounters people have with
government officials.
The emergence of a national conversation on public expectations and the police has
enlivened a debate on trust in police and local government. Since 2014, several high-profile
killings involving police officers have helped to raise a national consciousness on whether
communities of color trust the police, and if they even should. Each of these cases -- Michael
Brown in Ferguson, MO; Tamir Race in Cleveland, Ohio; Eric Garner in Staten Island, NY; and
Darrius Stewart in Memphis, TN -- has attracted the public’s attention due to the lack of
consequence for the officers involved. Shortly following the August 2014 shooting of Michael
Brown, over 80 percent of black respondents in a national survey responded that the case “raises
important issues about race” (Doherty and Weisel, 2014), as opposed to 37 percent of white
respondents. In the same study, 76 percent of black Americans reported having, “not too much or
none at all” confidence in the shooting investigations. Over 50 percent of white Americans
reported having a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in them. This figure, revealing a 26point cleavage in trust, demonstrates the low confidence that black Americans have in the
political system to do what is right to keep communities safe. This low level of trust is certainly
influenced by the perceived injustices by the police system, but reveals the deep discontent and
distrust the community feels toward government.
This study contributes to this debate by examining the effects of law enforcement review
boards on political trust and political efficacy. Review boards are a common solution offered by
governments to rebuild trust in a community that is distrustful of the government. This study
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asks whether this is successful, and in so doing, helps answer the broader question of whether
political trust responds to institutional reforms.
My hypothesis is that law enforcement review boards will increase political trust and
perceptions of efficacy in government. Depending on the angle, political trust can be an
independent or dependent variable; trust affects the outcomes of government, while situational
forces like decision makers and the economy influence levels of political trust as well. This study
looks at law enforcement review boards as an independent variable that influences trust. I
hypothesize that trust will increase with the presence of a review board. Measuring trust by law
enforcement review boards shows how much people trust the process. Will they get justice?
Does the presence of a law enforcement review board make them more assured in seeking
justice? Do they feel safer with the police? Would they feel safer with the presence of a review
board, and would they trust the complaint system more if they knew there were outside
influences on the police? Do they believe police departments can investigate fellow officers?
To answer these questions, I employ mixed methods. Activists who publicly support
civilian oversight of the police can describe the public need for accountability, transparency, and
efficacy in law enforcement, and discuss the environmental factors that lead to demands for
greater accountability. The intention of review boards is to increase accountability in police
departments, which is meant to increase trust, because the boards provide an alternative to
reporting complaints against officers to officers. I interviewed activists in Memphis, TN and
Bakersfield, CA where at time of interview there was no instituted system of public oversight,
despite an identified need from parts of the community, and in Denver, CO and Austin, TX,
where established independent monitors investigate complaints from the public against police
officers and make recommendations to law enforcement agencies to improve community-police
3

relations, and consequently, trust. Second, I fielded a survey experiment of college students in
Memphis to test whether the presence of a law enforcement review board affects levels of trust
and perceptions of efficacy in the public. The survey was administered to over 230 students at
the university in the Spring semester of 2016. Questions included whether the respondent would
report a perceived injustice if committed against them by a police officer, whether the police
department protects its citizens, and if they have the power to affect change in government.
Overall, I find that, in spite of the high expectations of outcomes influencing perceptions of
government and the police, law enforcement review boards do not affect either, and in some
cases may decrease perceptions of efficacy.

4

Literature Review
Trust and Efficacy
The American government depends on the trust citizens place in their representatives
and, as such, many scholars have debated this trust in their writing. To the alarm of idealistic
observers, Americans do not seem to trust the government. Lack of trust and low perceptions of
governmental efficacy are central problems in American politics today, and the essential
concerns of this study. Perceptions of the government by its constituency are vital for democratic
representation and exploring the effects of trust in institutions like government and police on
trust are essential for describing the current political climate in the US.
Political trust is an essential component of government, in particular to a representative
democracy. Particularly for representative democracies, its systemic functioning depends on
trust, because people must trust their government representatives and institutions. “If people
come to think that institutions are not working in either their or the nation’s best interest, it is not
clear why they would continue to follow the laws set by these institutions” (Hetherington, 2005,
12). An individual’s trust in government is often informed by experiences with the government’s
agents and actors. For a democracy to function, the people must trust in the system itself, even if
they don’t trust the individuals in power (Hetherington, 2005, 10).
According to some, democracies work best when their citizens believe the government
reflects their interests and its leaders can be trusted to do what is right. Indicators of political
trust include interpersonal and social trust, because “societies with greater political trust tend to
have citizens who talk to each other, who work together, and who generally get along” (Wilkes,
2015, 385). Political trust and the success of government programs exist in a complementary
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relationship. When the public’s trust and expectations of government are low, official policies
can be viewed as further examples of incompetent government actions which do not merit public
trust in government institutions. “The partial failure of programs on poverty and racism are
viewed cynically as the naturally low expectation of government will and capacity, even though
for a brief period government action on these problems was seen as admirable” (Hardin, 2002,
87).
Trust is also an ever-present significant predictor from which people view and participate
in the political system. Political trust is created by an individual’s experiences interacting with
governmental institutions and agents, and the trust that forms informs the individual’s
perceptions of government as a whole based on these interactions. Like party affiliation, trust has
“a profound influence across the full range of political objects to which the individual voter
responds” (Campbell, et al., 1960, 128). Similar to an individual’s party identification or political
ideology, political trust is like an umbrella that someone stands under while looking out at the
political system, and it affects how they view the political system and the world in general.
Political trust has been steadily decreasing since scholars began measuring the concept;
political trust was at its highest in 1958, the first year American National Election Studies
(ANES) began including questions to assess it (Foster, 1978; Hetherington, 2005; Miller; 1974).
The questions used to measure trust have remained identical since then, asking, “How much of
the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?” (ANES Time Series,
2010). Unlike other, more concrete questions about the political environment, questions on trust
are abstract, asking how often people believe government actors do what is right: always, most
of the time, some of the time, or almost never. American political trust, public confidence in the
government to do what is right, has dramatically decreased, revealing a cultural trend. In 1958,
6

“Seventy-three percent of adults said they put their faith in the federal government ‘most’ or
‘some’ of the time. In 2014, the last time anyone asked this question, roughly 24 percent of the
adult population in the United States trusted the federal government to do what was right most or
some of the time” (Vavreck, 2015).
Over time, trust in the government has declined so much that in the contemporary
political landscape, “government and politics are ‘dirty’ words that convey contemptuous and
derisive feelings” (Citrin, 1974, 978). As Miller noted in 1974, the general downward trend of
the American people towards government shows a “negative orientation toward the political
system,” while the fluctuations of trust that react to changes in political events and the economy
reveal a “hostility toward political and social leaders” (Miller, 1974, 951), which are
personifications and representatives of the political system itself. Momentary ups and downs in
political trust don’t necessarily mean imminent disaster for the American political system, as
they can be explained by dissatisfaction with a leader or policy decision (Citrin, 1974; Citrin and
Green, 1986; Miller, 1974) which are always replaceable entities. The effect of economics and
politics on political trust does not equate to approval ratings. Although people may develop their
perceptions of trust through satisfaction or dissatisfaction with political incumbents or economic
situations, the long-term decline in political trust reflects an accumulation of individual distrust
that becomes people’s attitude and outlook on the political system (Levi and Stoker, 2000).
While political trust is influenced by short-term political influences, it also exhibits “strong
connections to early socialization and its attendant longer-lasting predispositions” (Cook and
Gronke, 2005, 795).
Is distrust in the political system dangerous for democracy, or even bad for it, in itself?
Liberal theorists do not necessarily agree. A central tenet of political liberalism is skepticism of
7

government in general, and the ideas of liberals are the foundation of the United States
government. The achievement of the US Constitution to many of its authors, including James
Madison, was its adherence to unhindered commerce (Hardin, 2002, 73), as opposed to an
adherence of the authority of government over commerce. The rallying cry symbolizing the
American revolution, “No taxation without representation,” commands government to respond to
the demands of its constituents and reflects the distrust in government of the time (Ely, 1980,
89).
One of the foundations of the American legal system is due process. In the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause is renowned for guaranteeing the rights and equality of all
citizens. The Clause “provides that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law’” (Ely, 1980, 14). Evidenced by the American Constitution, which
was heavily influenced by liberal theorists, distrust of government is a good thing. Moreover,
democracy is not in decline in popularity, but the government. Polls and statistics revealing a
decline in political trust shows that people distrust the government; its leaders and their policies.
Liberal theorists like Adam Smith and John Locke were distrustful of the arbitrariness of
the English monarchic system, which led them to support the liberal paradigm which promotes
much less government intervention, particularly in economic ventures of individuals. Ideas of
these theorists, that government should protect the individual’s life, liberty, and pursuit of
property, were inspiring to the founders of the United States, and their skepticism of government
saturates the founders’ ideology. Locke maintained that, “society turns power over to its
governors, ‘whom society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit Trust, that it shall be
imployed [sic] for their good, and the preservation of their Property” (quoted in Hardin, 1999,
22). The society may turn certain powers over to the government, but for the most part, for
8

liberals like Locke, the individual’s rights outweigh the government’s dominance and any
increases in power that infringe on the individual should be considered an advance to tyranny.
Classic liberals did not advocate for the total obliteration of government, but a tempering
of its power in general, checks on the extent of the power of individuals in order to avoid
arbitrary use of power and tyranny, and an assurance that commerce and trade would be free for
the individual to pursue, never dominated or taken advantage of by the state. French theorist
Montesquieu argued that powers in government must be separated in order to prevent arbitrary
use of power. Montesquieu’s ideas influenced the founders of the American government, who
were wary of the concentration of powers in a monarchy. To avoid arbitrariness of power, they
incorporated separation of powers and codified the distrust of government, “to reduce the odds of
the arbitrariness that might follow from having any one of the branches fully in control” (Hardin,
2002, 82).
From the liberal perspective, distrust in government is healthy to ensure accurate
representation. People don’t trust the government as they trust friends, family, and confidantes;
interpersonal trust is different than political trust because trust in government is not necessarily a
conscious decision. Trust in government reflects accumulative experiences, and relies on
expectations of the government’s output in policy and services. For example, trusting an
institution depends mostly on its predictability and past behavior. Expectations of government,
the perception of its success or failure at delivering services and maintaining social order and
infrastructure reveal trust (Hardin, 1999, 30). Distrust and skepticism in government is healthy in
order to preserve transparency.
The sources of an individual’s political trust, like their personal economic situation or
satisfaction with leaders or policy, can have lasting effects that shape their trust in government
9

for years to come. “In effect, these political views describe the interplay between political events
and citizens’ reactions to those events” (Damico et al., 2000, 395). Political trust is essentially an
output of people’s reactions to events like war, scandals involving political leaders, and
economic crises. Once trust in the government and its institutions is lost, it is very difficult to
recover (Hetherington 1998, 791; Lamare & Lamare 2015; Cook & Gronke 2005). While
political trust levels can rise and fall with changes in the economy and elections (Hetherington
2005; Hetherington & Husser 2012; Citrin 1974 Cook & Gronke 2005), such contextual forces
can accumulate to a distrust in the government system in general.
Political trust is influenced by short-term situations, like an individual’s current economic
situation. However, political trust is also an entrenched attitude that reveals an individual’s
perceptions of the entire political system. Considering both short-term influences and its
implications, any definitions of political trust should include both actions that reveal trust in
government, like participation, as well as more theoretical ideas on what public trust may mean
for issues in the government, such as how political trust may affect public perceptions of
government. The operationalization I use for this thesis is modeled after Marc Hetherington’s
Why Trust Matters. Political trust is, “the degree to which people perceive that government is
producing outcomes consistent with their expectations” (2005, 9). The expectations of citizens
with respect to government includes the maintaining of infrastructure and social order, and
functioning of government in terms of policy decisions and representation. Of course
Hetherington’s is not the sole source that imagines trust as dependent on the perceptions and
expectations of people. For political trust, perceptions of government are what matter in regards
to citizens’ expectations, even more than the government’s past performance in delivering on
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citizens’ wishes in policy or services (OECD 2013; Miller 1974; Lamare & Lamare 2015; Levi
& Stoker 2000).
As part of the government, institutions influence political trust, as well as perceptions of
efficacy, which is the perceived power to produce a desired outcome of effect. Efficacy looks
both inward and outward; internal efficacy refers to a person’s own ability to affect the desired
result, while external efficacy refers to the government and institutions’ responsiveness to citizen
demands (Craig 1979; Craig, Niemi, & Silver 1990, 290; Craig & Maggiotto 1982, Acock, et al.
1985; Southwell 2012). When explaining “efficacy,” most are referring to internal efficacy.
Internal efficacy is complementary to political trust because an individual participating in
democracy is indicative of that individual’s belief in their ability to influence the political system
with their vote. As the extant literature on trust has demonstrated, for democracy to function
correctly, the voters have to believe that voting is an effective action. External efficacy is similar,
particularly with respect to government institutions. Citizens of a democracy have to believe that
institutions will respond to their demands via democracy and participation for them to maintain
their legitimacy to the public.
Political trust and internal efficacy help explain levels of participation in government.
Participation and internal efficacy have a complementary relationship; past participation is the
best predictor in regards to a citizen’s participation, and participating in government indicates
trust and belief in the political system. Opposition to political system, government institutions,
leaders, and policies, promote low levels of trust and external efficacy, while participation shows
a higher sense of both efficacy and trust (Lamare & Lamare 2015, 362; Finkel 1985). Political
trust and efficacy can effectively be treated as a complementary relationship, “because the more
responsive you believe your government is, the more you are going to trust it” (Damico et al.
11

2000, 395). The idea that trust and efficacy coalesce to corresponding attitudes harkens to the
principles of liberalism again: no taxation without representation, no public trust without
government responsiveness.
Racism, ‘The Elephant in the Room’
Due to an unbroken history of social and legal discrimination, racial minorities,
particularly black Americans and Latinos, experience the political system differently than white
Americans, and therefore have different levels of trust in the government. This has profound
effects on public opinion and perceptions of the political system. The racial divide in public
opinion, particularly on policies that disproportionately affect racial minorities, is often clear,
and racial differences in group identity and racial resentment help explain the gap in policy
support (Hutchings & Valentino 2004, 389). The differing experiences of race stands out in
public opinion because for racial minorities, race is the most dominant identity (Hutchings &
Valentino 2004; Dawson 1994). Race as a variable has a strong effect on political ideology and
party identification. In the National Black Election Survey (NBES), racial identification is the
clear paramount identity, dominating ideology and affecting policy preferences more than any
other variable. “This was true especially for race-specific and redistributive programs. Partisan
and ideological identifications also played a significant role, but these political attachments are
partially influenced by racial identification” (Hutchings & Valentino 2004, 395). For black
Americans in particular, as a minority that has experienced a distinct lack of resources, historical
racism, and systemic poverty, race is the dominant identity.
Regarding social issues, especially racialized issues like affirmative action, and others
with racialized overtones like public housing or education, differences in public opinion between
black Americans and their white counterparts are largest (Kinder & Winter 2001, 450). Even on
12

social welfare policies lacking overt racial implications, such as social policies on redistribution,
the racial divide between black and white voters exists, reflecting persistent differences in
political identity and experience in different races. Additionally, for racialized social issue
policies, black Americans tend to be cognizant of group interest, which heavily influence selfinterest. This racial solidarity is due to structural racism based on race, “in societies ravaged by
racial or ethnic conflict, individual success may be strongly linked to group success” (Dawson
1995, 57). Critical Race Theory conceptualizes structural racism as pervasive and diffused
throughout society as opposed to a pathology of a few individuals, as a permanent systemic
condition that structures institutions and relationships” (Vaught and Castagno 2008, 96).
Structural racism emerges in societal institutions such as education inequality, incarceration, and
disenfranchisement.
It is likely that for the same reasons African-American identity is a strong indicator of
public opinion and issue orientation, historical injustices and enduring inequalities, that the group
has lower levels of trust in government (Foster 1978, Nunnally 2012; Wilkes 2015; Howell and
Fagan 1988). There is no connection between physical characteristics like skin color and trust, so
the lower levels of trust felt by black Americans indicates that the expectations of government
that government represents the needs, desires, and policy preferences of its constituents, are not
met. Therefore, it is reasonable to deduce that black Americans “perceive the political system as
less responsive and accessible” (Wilkes 2015, 356), which is reflected in lower levels of political
trust than their white peers.
Experiences with the police reveal the racial cleavage in trust. That black Americans
perceive the police as an example of an unresponsive and inaccessible government is an
understatement. For government in general, but particularly for the police, black Americans do
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not believe the government has been unresponsive to needs, desires, and policy preferences, but
instead that the government has actively subordinated them.
A theory of social deprivation attributes political distrust and low perceptions of efficacy
to deprivation; “that blacks are more deprived, in general, than whites is a possible explanation
for high black levels of alienation and trust” (Foster 1978, 246). “Social deprivation”
encompasses poverty, and lacking educational, economic, and political opportunities. For
African-Americans in particular, un-democratic experiences of slavery, disenfranchisement, and
redlining, to name a few, have led to a justifiable distrust in government; “‘distrust,” not ‘trust,’
has been the basis on which race relations have been institutionalized in America” (Nunnally
2012, 11). Lower levels of political trust for black Americans reveals not just a short-term
dissatisfaction with the current leaders, individual financial situation, or the current presidential
administration, but, a “deep malaise with the political system reflecting decades of political
exclusion and violence” (Wilkes 2015, 356). Black Americans’ trust in government must be
viewed through the lens of historical consequences; as previously mentioned, once perceptions
of trust and efficacy are lost, it is very difficult to increase them.
The social construction of “race” is complex and much too large for the scope of this
paper, but the idea of race, ethnicity, and racial minorities is complicated even further when
Latinos are considered. Even within the United States, there is no one clear depiction of what
makes a “Latino.” People from geographic locations in the southwestern United States and
southward to the southernmost parts of South America are considered Latinos, and that
categorization encompasses innumerable languages and ethnic identities. Critics of a Pan-Latino
categorization oppose the positioning of varied identities as dichotomous to White Americans.
Latinos undeniably have a much different history of economic barriers and structural racism than
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that of black Americans, and as a result they experience political trust and efficacy much
differently.
The dilemma for grouping such diverse groups into one Latino category is respecting
exceedingly diverse identities while attempting to make observations about experiences of
people of color. As is often the case in statistics, there may be more variance within these groups
than between them. This method uses the white experience as baseline, and does not take into the
internal diversity in race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and language preference within a
single category like Latino or black. For the purpose of this thesis, Latinos are considered a racial
or ethnic minority made up of people who identify as Latino or Hispanic in the United States.
While not all Latinos speak Spanish1, the most commonly spoken language of Latinos
throughout the world, particularly those in the United States, is Spanish. The United States is the
second largest Spanish speaking country in the world, second only to Mexico (Burgen 2015). US
American media outlets such as Univisión and Telemundo broadcast in Spanish and advertise to
Latinos in general, but not necessarily to a specific country, region of origin, or ethnic group. It
is particularly difficult to distinguish a single unified group called “Latino” in the United States.
Latinos in the US, “increasingly internally diverse by subgroup and region, yet with majorities
who continue to bear the brunt of global capital and state power. The Latino identity
encompasses people from vastly different races, including Afro-Latinos, white descendants of
European colonizers, mestizos who come from indigenous and Spanish descent, and innumerous

1

Language as identity is a major indication of acculturation for immigrants, and the evolution of language
for second, third etc. generation populations. Due to rich internal variation of Latinos, Spanish cannot be
considered the official language of Latinos; the most spoken language of Brazilians is Portuguese,
Chicanos and Latino-Americans in the US may only speak English as their dominant language, and a
myriad of indigenous ethnic groups throughout Latin America retain indigenous languages as primary or
secondary tongues. However, because the focus of this thesis is the United States, I consider Spanish to
be a primary linguistic link categorizing Latinos.
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different indigenous groups from every region of Latin America. Simultaneously, growing
numbers of Latinos are experiencing upward mobility, educational advancement, and
socioeconomic inclusion” (Beltrán 2010, 68). Internal variation within the Latino racial or ethnic
group is also due to the numbers of Latinos in the US, which is the second-largest and most
rapidly growing minority in the country.
Latinos cannot be easily identified as a single group, because there are so many differing
identifiable subgroups of Latino. While Latinos cannot be considered a single group, the Latino
voting bloc, comprised of the various different identities in the country, is an amalgam of them.
The strongest argument for the “Latino” group is through opposition to government policies that
are perceived to target people who “look illegal,” which is coded language for people who look
as if they immigrated to the US without papers. The dominant perception of the “illegal
immigrant” is from Mexico and Central America, which amounts to a dangerous stereotype.
Regardless of generation2, Latinos overwhelmingly oppose policies that are perceived to target
Latinos, such as Arizona’s SB-1070. Policies like SB-1070 carry specific implications for
Latinos. “Their consensus is likely a result of the widespread expectation that enforcement would
conceivably threaten all Latinos, a belief that again transcends generation” (Segura 2012, 11).
Acculturation theory focuses on the effect becoming American, acculturating into the
dominant culture form an ethnic enclave, has on immigrants and Latinos. This theory argues that
because noncitizens and recent immigrants are lacking in assimilation to the dominant political
culture, and may not have necessarily participated as much as natural-born citizens or
immigrants who have been in the country for much longer, they have a much more positive view

2

“Generation” with respect to Latinos often refers to first, second, third, etc. generation immigrants,
though many Latinos in the US have origins within the country, such as Tejanos in Texas whose
ancestors have resided in the area since before its annexation to the United States, yet also identify as
Latinos.
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of the political system. For example, classic assimilation theory would predict that MexicanAmerican citizens will be more cynical about government than Mexican-descent non-citizens,
and that US-born Puerto Ricans will be more cynical than island born Puerto Ricans” (Michelson
2001, 324). If political trust is accumulated in part through expectations of government services
and of political officials’ behavior, new immigrants to the US would not be distrustful of the
government due to experiences with it, which is why trust levels are higher. These groups have
yet to experience distrust of leaders, policies, and the political system as a whole, and, “are less
likely to have adopted these attitudes as their own” (Michelson 2003, 922).
Also, new immigrants to the US believe more strongly in the American exceptionalism
myth, and successive generations, more acclimated, are more capable of recognizing themselves
as part of an unequal minority. “As members of the Latino community become part of the
American culture, they learn to be critical of it because they become aware of their unequal
position in society and the realities of discrimination” (Michelson 2001, 325). Trust in Latinos
decays between consecutive generations. As successive generations of immigrants become more
Americanized, political trust declines. “Second and third generations report feeling uncertain
about politics and also disempowered. In a national survey of youth attitudes toward voting,
Latino youth were found to have the least trust in government and to be the least likely to believe
that their vote counted” (Bedolla 2005, 111). As a youth group, Latinos have the lowest levels of
political trust and efficacy. Trust in institutions (influenced by experiences in institutions like
education and immigration systems) also affects an individual’s relationship to democratic
institutions where she lives (Kelly 2009, 530), which also influence trust in political institutions.
Decreasing trust levels in Latinos reflect the larger trends of the American public. Latino
distrust is unambiguous: 90% of first-generation Latinos, 82% of the second, 79% if third, and
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67% of fourth-generation Latinos trust the US government (Segura 2012, 12), triggered in no
small part by opposition to policies created by government leaders. For black Americans and
Latinos, low levels of political trust reflect an understanding of disadvantaged minority status,
and race as the major identification for minorities has large implications on political
identification, policy preferences, and trust.
A consequence of several factors, racial and ethnic minorities3 in the country have
experiences that distinguish them from the rest of the general population and aid in creating a
group identity. For black Americans, group identity is created by historical discrimination and
injustice, and heavily influences individual political opinion and perceptions of leaders and
policy. Black Americans are as a whole much more receptive to social distributive policies. For
Latinos, group identity is created through opposition to racial profiling policies and the
politicians that champion them. For these racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, a
shared characteristic is lower levels of political trust than the total population.
Both internal and external efficacy can be palpable in local government due to the smaller
size and scope than state or federal government. For racial minorities, low levels of trust and
efficacy result in low levels of voter turnout (Hajnal & Trounstine 2005), particularly in local
elections. However, increasing representation in government of racial minorities has proven to be
a significant way of increasing trust and perceptions of efficacy in communities of color. On a
municipal level, the presence of black leaders increases political trust in black communities
(Rahn & Rudolph 2015; Browning, et al. 1986; Foster 1978; Hajnal & Trounstine 2014; Abney
& Hutcheson 1981; Foster 1978). In a city-wide study of youth in East St. Louis, perceptions of

3

The phrase “racial and ethnic minorities” refers to non-white populations in general. In this study
specifically, the phrase is in reference to respondents with Latino, Middle Eastern/Arab, Native
American, and black respondents.
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the city’s mayor of youth were examined through evaluations of the mayor. The study concludes
that youth, in a city with a black mayor, “are more positive in evaluating that official than are
black youth in a community with a white mayor” (Foster 1978, 251) when compared to
perceptions of the white mayor in Peoria, IL. In another city-wide study, Atlanta residents were
asked in 1981 about their city leadership. Trust in government remained stable despite a decline
in trust of government on a national level (Abney & Hutcheson 1981, 98). It is hypothesized that
general perceptions of city government are affected by residents who identify with the city’s
most visible political leaders.
Local political institutions have pronounced effects on communities of color, and
experiences with local government institutions include government services and infrastructure.
Experiences with institutions like school district authorities and the police can alter perceptions
of local government in a daily, accumulative way that does not occur with government on the
state or federal level. Trust of the police to protect, or to “do what is right,” to borrow from
ANES’ measure of trust in government, is extremely low in communities of color. The
difference between white Americans and racial minorities in trust of police is often over ten
points (McCarthy 2014; Doherty, et al. 2015). Race is an undeniable factor in every step of
community-police relations. Local police departments are institutions that reflect the values and
priorities of the city’s officials, and interactions with police often inform people’s experiences
with local government in general. Racial tensions in a city erode trust with police and expose
distrust of government in communities of color (Task Force 2015, Alexander 2012, McCarthy
2014, Fyfe 1982, Browning, et al. 1984).
In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement’s emergence throughout the country,
trust in the police has emerged as a major issue among communities of color (Coates 2015).
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Trust in the police is informed by personal experiences and events such as highly publicized
cases of police brutality. The accumulative quality of trust in the police is similar to political
trust accumulating from situational forces like an individual’s current economic situation, their
view of a political leader, and current events. In the 1990s, after the highly-publicized Rodney
King case in which LAPD officers beat King during a traffic stop and were acquitted, trust in
police, particularly in communities of color, plummeted (McCarthy 2014). Similar to reactions to
King, complaints of excessive force against police officers affects public trust of the police
(Naegele 1967; Coates 2015; Wright 2000; Swaine & Laughland 2015; Young 2000).
Aside from highly publicized cases of police violence, mass incarceration affects
disproportionate amounts of people in communities of color. For black Americans in particular,
the racial makeup of the criminal justice system is exceptionally disproportionate as “AfricanAmericans now constitute 900,000 of the total 2.2 million incarcerated” (Mauer and King 2007,
1). The national incarceration rate for whites is about 400 per 100,000, and 742 per 100,000
Latinos are incarcerated, compared to nearly 2,300 for black Americans (Mauer & King 2007).
According to a 2001 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics on incarceration statistics,
Latino men are incarcerated far more frequently than white men but still less frequently than
black men. Over 30 percent of black men, 17 percent of Latino men, and just under 6 percent of
white men will be imprisoned during their lifetime. For women, the rates of lifetime likelihood
of going to prison are much lower, though the hierarchy remains the same in that black women
are much more likely to be incarcerated than Latina women or white women (Bonczar 2003).
The soaring rates of incarceration are attributed by some to the policies of the War on
Drugs, which have had devastating effects on black and Latino communities; in 2000 over 2
million people were incarcerated, and ninety percent of those admitted to prison for drug

20

offenses were black or Latino (Alexander 2012, 56). Due to the racial implications of policing
and incarceration, appeals for relief frequently involve the narratives of communities of color
who perceive vast inequities in government perpetuated by the police (Alexander 2012; West
1994; Carroll & Gonzalez 2014). Police departments, as major institutions of local government,
reveal disproportionate negative outcomes that devastate communities of color; these outcomes
“are a function of perceived difference in the quality of city services that they receive” (Hajnal &
Trounstine 2014, 64) and are thought to affect trust in the government.
Models of Civilian Oversight
A popular means to increase civilian oversight of the police is the implementation of a
law enforcement review board (Browning et al. 1984, Task Force 2015, Roach 2014). Review
boards and internal monitors are common models of providing civilian oversight to local
government by independently investigating complaints against officers and officer-involved
shootings, and making recommendations to law enforcement agencies. These boards are
comprised of civilians who are not law enforcement officials (Walker & Bumphus, 1992, 1) to
ensure the separation between the public and the police. A common saying by proponents of
review boards is that the “police cannot police themselves,” meaning Internal Affairs division of
police departments are ineffectual. Civilians serving on review boards reveals the public distrust
of the police which drives the initial calls for creation of oversight agencies as well.
Oversight institutions like review boards and independent monitors investigate
complaints made against police officers by civilians (Walker & Bumphus 1992, 1). Activists
who work for police accountability observe a distinct lack of trust in the city, and often a review
board is suggested to build trust between the community and police by ensuring independent
investigation of complaints. Calls for police accountability often become publicized in the
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aftermath of an individual case, or several cases of police brutality. The intention of review
boards is to increase accountability in police departments, which is meant to increase trust,
because the boards provide an alternative to reporting complaints against officers to officers.
Review boards are local entities designed to provide an oversight arm over the local
police departments’ internal investigation apparatus. Review boards serve as an illustration of
how reforms can increase public trust in institutions. Oversight of the police reveals distrust with
the existing system of Internal Affairs investigating complaints against officers in many cities.
“The lack of engagement with democratic control and responsibility of the police reflects a
deeper malaise about the state of democracy” (Roach, 2014). Law enforcement review boards, as
a means to build trust and increase engagement with democratic control of the police by public
oversight, are the means this study will employ to examine political trust and perceptions of
efficacy. In other words, does civilian oversight accomplish its stated goal of increasing political
trust?
According to the extant literature (Bobb 2003, Young 2000, Hudson 1971, Walker &
Bumphus 1992, Roach 2014), review boards are designed to reintroduce trust into communitypolice relations, which has suffered due to perceptions of over-policing, excessive force, and a
lack of efficacy. As Hudson writes, “The tensions that exist between the police and some citizens
reduce the likelihood that those citizens will be willing to accept current accountability
procedures as fair or adequate” (1971, 518). Public perceptions of police misconduct have the
potential to erode trust within a community (Roach 2014), and institutional reform is intended to
transfer the investigative authority from the police to the public. Oversight is able to increase
trust in government by bringing to light the processes which traditionally have served the
interests of the police, and not the people.
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In local government, due to smaller jurisdictions, increasing representation can have
immediate impacts (Hajnal and Trounstine 2009), and local actions can be easier to achieve than
federal-level policy. Review boards have been created in cities throughout the US in an effort to
create stronger trust in the efficacy of local government. “Trust in local government is related to
a number of individual-level factors, including local political efficacy, perceived local
conditions, ideology, homeownership, and race” (Rahn & Rudolph 2005, 550). Review boards
attempt to increase trust and efficacy by democratizing how individuals interact with the police,
hoping to ensure objective investigations, dispense justice when necessary. According to the
National Association of Community Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), review boards
give complainants a place to voice concerns outside of the law enforcement agency, help hold
the police department accountable for the officer’s actions, help improve the quality of the
department’s internal affairs department, and lastly, reassure the community that appropriate
discipline is carried out (NACOLE 2015). Review boards often offer suggestions to police
departments and municipal governments to take in order to achieve goals of strengthening
community confidence in the local police department (see Task Force 2015, Young 2000,
Hudson 1971, Bobb 2003; Roach 2014).
Community organizations and advocate groups are often among those calling for review
boards in the wake of high-profile incidents involving officers. Because policing “inherently
involves social and political judgments about social order that are biased in favor of the status
quo” (Bass 2000, 149), there exists a tension between local police departments and the groups
calling for change. At least initially, those who initiate demands for oversight do not necessarily
represent the general public at large; “those community members and organizations with greater
social capital are more likely to participate than those with fewer social resources” (Bass 2000,
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151). These organizations often count family members of victims and activists among the first to
attempt convincing local government decision-makers to create a civilian oversight organization.
Creating a narrative of accountability and representation, review boards are intended to
create a system through which to increase public trust of the police and local government. The
narrative around creating review boards to monitor and investigate local police departments is
couched in language of accountability, compassion, inclusion, and democracy. Often, this
process includes building social knowledge of the general public on the lived experience of those
who raise complaints against police officers. In Inclusion and Democracy, Iris Marion Young
describes the contribution of narrative to the political environment by “the social knowledge it
offers of what are the likely effects of policies and actions on people in different social locations”
(Young 2000, 76). Activists who support civilian oversight and review boards point to
perceptions of trust and efficacy in local institutions by emphasizing the lived experiences of
victims of police violence. Opponents of review boards often point to the experiences of officers,
who maintain the right to police sovereignty when defending internal processes of review and
investigation (Bobb 2002, 2).
Narratives built to increase support for public oversight should increase public
perceptions of access to the police and local government. The implementation of a review board
should increase perceptions of efficacy, because local government officials respond to demands
from the people by creating the board. This should serve to build trust in the community.
Responding to pressure for transparency and accountability in the police exemplifies an
institutional machination that affects and contributes to people’s perceptions of trust and efficacy
in government (Logan & Molotch 2007). Local government in particular is often represented by
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its police officers in the daily lives of individuals, in their communities, and in perceptions of law
and order in general.
In Memphis, TN, a city that has a large mobilization effort underway for the
implementation of a new review board, 60 percent of the total population believes the Memphis
Police Department needs stronger oversight from the public, which is further illuminated by
racial differences. 68 percent of black Memphians support public oversight of the police,
compared to 44 percent of white residents (Veazey 2015). This poll, conducted by the
Commercial Appeal newspaper, came in the wake of a highly publicized shooting of unarmed
teenager Darrius Stewart by an MPD officer.
Review boards are regularly proposed by community leaders, activists, and families of
victims of police shootings. The boards seek to reform how people make complaints against
police officers, which is anticipated by supporters to ensure officers change their behavior.
Supporters of public oversight hope that the publicizing of complaints against the police will
effectively transform the actions of police officers to impede the causes. Essentially, if there are
fewer incidents of excessive force or misconduct, there will be fewer complaints made or reasons
for the board to investigate. The various proposed effects of review boards have the potential to
increase public trust in local governments, especially among communities of color, where
political distrust is highest. The efficacy of review boards in regards to political trust is the focus
of this thesis.
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“Shoot Now, Ask Questions Later”: Activist Interviews
To address the questions of context and environmental conditions preceding and
following public debates on civilian oversight, I conducted interviews with activists and those
who sit on review boards or independent monitors. Qualitative interviews allowed interviewees
to provide contextual data that filled holes left by the survey experiment. Activists described
their cities before and after the existence of review boards, and how communities changed
through calls for accountability. I spoke with activists because as people who have a high level
of knowledge on civilian oversight, they would be able to explicitly connect policies and
political atmospheres of their cities to political trust and perceptions of efficacy. This study’s
survey experiment measured the level of trust respondents place in the police, but the reasons
why review boards are considered a solution for distrust are also important, and a topic that was
better explored through semi-structured interviews.
I spoke with activists in Memphis, TN, Austin, TX, Bakersfield, CA, and Denver, CO.
The cities I chose either had civilian oversight (Austin and Denver), or did not (Memphis and
Bakersfield). These cities were chosen because each has experienced nationally publicized cases
of officer-involved shootings within the past five years, regardless of whether the metropolitan
area has a formal system of public oversight.4 For example, Bakersfield is the largest city in Kern
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In Denver, Paul Castaway and Jessie Hernandez were shot by DPD officers in 2015.
(http://www.mintpressnews.com/death-of-paul-castaway-highlights-denvers-overlooked-police-brutalityproblem/207941/). In late 2015, the Guardian named Bakersfield the deadliest city in the United States for
police killings; James de la Rosa and David Silva are two of the highly-publicized cases
(http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/01/the-county-kern-county-deadliest-police-killings).
Darrius Stewart, an unarmed African-American teenager, was killed by Memphis Police Officers in a
traffic stop in June 2015, and the US Department of Justice announced in December that it would conduct
a federal investigation of the shooting (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/12/14/doj-will-investigate-july-death-of-darrius-stewart-an-unarmed-black-19-year-oldshot-by-police-in-memphis/). Finally, in Austin, David Joseph was shot by Austin police on February 8,
2015 (http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2016-03-11/shout-into-the-wind/).
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County, the county with the dubious distinction of experiencing more fatal shootings of unarmed
civilians by the police relative to population in the country (Swaine and Laughland 2015).
Bakersfield does not have public oversight of the police. Meanwhile, even though Denver’s
Independent Monitor was established in 2004, several people were killed by police in 2015 alone
(Paul 2015).
In each city, public struggle continues for increasing the independence and force of
public oversight. While all interviewees told distinct stories of highly publicized incidents of
officer-involved shootings, consistently of unarmed men of color, every interview touched on
systemic cultures of police violence, an accumulation of distrust, and scarred, traumatized
families, witnesses, and victims. Key figures in each site’s struggle for police accountability
include family members of victims, community organizers who work with victims’ families,
victims themselves, and people who serve in local institutions of oversight. The context for
police accountability is steeped in racial and class inequity; accountability measures directly
challenge policies that target people of color.
Does this system work, considering its intents? Do review boards increase perceptions of
trust in the community? Texas Civil Rights Project director Jim Harrington believes that current
systems of oversight cannot increase trust in the community because they are too weak to
provide real change. “I’m not saying that [review boards] don’t work. They can be very helpful
in bringing things to light. However, if the purpose really is to dramatically improve the police
system and officer behavior, they stop short because they lack the institutional strength to
actually be able to do anything substantial.”5
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Interview with Jim Harrington, Attorney & Director of Texas Civil Rights Project. 2015.
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Joey Williams is the lead organizer at Kern County Faith in Action in Kern County, CA,
which still lacks an oversight organization and whose law enforcement officers are among the
nation’s deadliest. In a county of 875,000, 13 people were killed by police in 2015 (Swaine and
Laughland 2015). Williams describes the pervasive environment of distrust in Kern County.
“There is no trust here. Nobody wants to call the police anymore; I’m not calling the police.
People feel like they might end up getting shot! It might be a stretch, but people perceive it as a
real possibility.”6
In Denver, CO, calls from the community for oversight and demands for accountability
drove the city’s mayor and city council to create the Independent Monitor. Whether they are
activists who continue to push for a review board, community members who achieved
institutionalized oversight in the city government, or citizens who sit on the board themselves,
people in every city insist that review boards and oversight agencies need to exist, and that their
powers should be unequivocally expanded to include mandatory powers to influence the actions
of the police. Jennifer Fratello, Denver Independent Monitor (DIM) policy director, focuses on
expanding the powers the organization has in the city. “Last year, we went to city council for an
expansion of DIM’s ordinance, so that we would have more leeway and access to documents and
information we need to conduct investigations. These things can take a while, but we need
automatic access from the police and sheriff’s departments in order to conduct fair, objective
investigations.”7
The process leading up to creating an apparatus for police oversight, such as a review board
or Police Monitor vary by city. In the interviews conducted for this thesis, definitive patterns
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Interview with Joseph “Joey” Williams, Lead Organizer of Faith in Action of Kern County, 2016.
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Interview with Jennifer Fratello, Policy Director of Denver Independent Monitor (DIM). 2016.
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emerged. In each city, civilian oversight is implemented as a response by the municipal
government to community organizations, activists, and victims’ families demanding justice in
cases of officer misconduct. In many of the cases, the officers involved did not face indictment
(Williams 2015, Fratello 2016, Garner 2015). Although each city has individuals who were killed
by police in unique incidents, each activist speaks to an accumulation of distrust toward local
police departments, which has directly led to low levels of trust in the communities they serve.
Lastly, each activist described the efficacy of their city’s review board or monitor in fulfilling its
intentions of building trust. Most often, civilian oversight is seen as a necessary first step to social
justice, but by no means a panacea to solve the problems of perceived inefficacy of the police due
to their difficulties in achieving independence from the police department, resistance from law
enforcement, and the continuing distrust of the public.
CLERB - Memphis, TN
In the case of the Civilian Law Enforcement Review Board (CLERB)8, in Memphis, TN,
several high-profile murders led to the implementation of the city’s review board, with notable
cases of police brutality as far back as 1970. “Our struggle for accountability in Memphis started
long before the infamous Michael Brown took place in Ferguson, MO. In 1970, after a young
man named Elton Hayes was killed by MPD officers and the outrage sparked city-wide rioting,
folks tried to establish a review board,” said Paul Garner, organizing coordinator at the MidSouth Peace and Justice Center, and police accountability activist. The current system of police
oversight in Memphis is very new; the city council passed an amended ordinance to reinstate a
defunct review board in October 2015. In Memphis, along with other cities, though there were
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The Civilian Law Enforcement Review Board city ordinance was passed by the Memphis city council
on Tuesday, November 3, 2015.
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highly publicized incidents of police murder that intensified community organizers, victims’
families, and several government officials calling for a new review board, the movement is
viewed as a long-standing accumulation against a culture of systemic neglect on the part of the
police.
The police culture reflects the racialized environment in Memphis; the city’s majority
African-American population continues to endure systemic racism in the form of failing schools,
mass incarceration, and generational poverty (Wright 2000, Rushing 2009, Mauer & King 2007).
“Even before the 1960s, two Memphises had always existed – one black disproportionately lowincome sector and one white, disproportionately middle-income sector – with diverging interests
and needs. As in other cities, racial polarization in Memphis worsened during the American Civil
Rights Movement. Andrew Hacker found that by the late 1960s, America had become ‘two
nations: black and white, separate, hostile, unequal’” (Wright 66).
The division is most evident in government institutions - infrastructure like housing, the
education system, and the disparate trust levels in the police. As a consequence, whites and
blacks see the police differently. In 2015, local newspaper The Commercial Appeal polled
Memphians concerning police oversight. “Sixty-eight percent of blacks said MPD does need
more oversight, compared to 44 percent of whites. Forty-one percent of whites said MPD does
not need stronger oversight, compared to 21 percent of blacks” (Veazey 2015). Like in other
cities with high-profile cases of police murder and community voices calling for stronger control
of the police by the people, the population of Memphis was split along racial lines in terms of its
review board on the eve of its implementation. The power of black voters in Memphis is clear,
the city’s population is 63.1 percent African-American, which ranks it eighth in the nation in
African-American populations (Rushing 2000, 5). Politically in Memphis, black voters have
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always formed a formidable voting bloc. For example, in the mid-20th century era of political
machines led by Boss Crump, the black population in Memphis was considered the major
support for “antiorganization factions” (Key 1949, 74) that could help politicians opposed to the
political machine gain power.
Trust in the police is low; expectations of the police are lower. People most affected by
the system CLERB looks to improve are disillusioned and cynical. “The campaign for oversight
confirmed suspicions about the way the government and its institutions operate, the lengths that
people will go to deny accountability and transparency while using the same words.”9 The
current incarnation of CLERB in Memphis was implemented by the city council just four months
after a highly-publicized case of police murder. Darrius Stewart, an unarmed black 19-year-old
was a passenger in a car pulled over for a traffic violation. Stewart was allegedly in handcuffs
when he was shot in the back and killed by MPD Officer Connor Schilling (Phillips 2015). The
officer was not indicted in the teen’s death.
The present day consequences of Memphis’ racialized legacy, a stop on the Mississippi
River slave trade and where Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, are visible in lowincome communities of color and their interactions with police. Like in the 1970s, when police
killed Elton Hayes and were brought to trial, the only apparatus for people who experience
excessive force from the police remains filing a complaint with the police department’s internal
affairs office. “The public feels that the MPD is just going to investigate itself, and it will just be
the same old thing where the cops face no consequences for their actions. People feel intimidated
and they think, ‘Why even bother complaining in the first place?’”10 To increase trust in the
9
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police, grassroots organizations and families of victims of police harassment began urging the
city to strengthen its oversight agency. Due to long waits for little information, consistently not
being informed on the process, and finally receiving a form that said, “sustained,” “unsustained,”
or, “unfounded,” police accountability advocates say that people engaging in the current police
system are denied basic information on their complaints in every step of the investigation
process. The lack of communication from the police department is a major issue for the activists;
access to records of police investigation is key for transparency, and a major point of contention
for activists who say the current system heavily favors the police officers.
For activists like Garner, the presence of CLERB does more than increase trust in the
police, it increases trust in the entire criminal justice system, as well as safety for the victims of
police violence. “When you go file an internal affairs complaint after you’ve had a negative or
traumatic experience with a police officer, and now you’re having to look across the table at
someone who’s wearing the same uniform as the person who just violated your rights. A lot of
people get discouraged and intimidated in this situation, so they either don’t make a complaint in
the first place, or throughout the process they give up, or don’t feel safe even seeing it through.”
Complaints broached by people against the police officers include excessive force, misconduct,
and police brutality. Civilian review boards permit complainants to speak with someone who is
not a uniformed police officer, and is not a law enforcement officer. “When you go file an
internal affairs complaint, right after you’ve had a negative or traumatic experience with a police
officer, and now you have to sit across the table from someone who is wearing the same uniform
as the person who you feel violated your rights, that might feel unsafe. That’s why a lot of people
don’t feel they can trust internal affairs, and why they feel intimated and don’t file complaints in
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the first place.”11 For various reasons, people who feel their rights have recently been violated by
police officers may not feel comfortable going through the process, which is one reason the
proposed new board members include lawyers and religious leaders independent of the police
department.
The intent of CLERB was to mend this process; review boards attempt to bring
accountability to police action by providing an objective, impartial investigative body to look
into complaints against police. The internal affairs process reveals an inherent conflict; it is
difficult and unlikely for police officers to indict their colleagues of wrongdoing. CLERB and
oversight agencies like it around the country seek to overhaul this process. “I’m not saying
[CLERB] will necessarily stop police harassment, but unless you document the cases, you don’t
have the information you need to build policies. This campaign created a more common and
open dialogue about the barriers to people finding justice in engaging with the criminal justice
system,” says Garner.
In Memphis, CLERB is the first step in building trust in communities that are skeptical of
the police and government after generations of inequities in services, education, and policing.
Garner continues, “Police review boards have been shown in other cities to help mend some of
the damaged public trust in police departments, and thereby act as a way to restore some of the
public confidence in the department’s ability to handle complaints with integrity.” For activists,
the most important phase of the implementation of Memphis’ review board is to ensure the
public feels confident in the process; utilization is key for measuring changes in public trust and
success of the system. Because CLERB was reinstated in late 2015, it remains to be seen whether
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the system will be as effective as proponents hope in increasing public trust of the police,
perceptions of efficacy of government, and in curbing instances of police misconduct.
The Independent Monitor – Denver, CO
The shooting by the Denver Police Department of Paul Childs in 2003, a mentally ill
teenager who was holding a knife, was the first of many highly publicized murders by the DPD,
and the impetus for the mayor and city council to create the Independent Monitor in 2004. Since
then, the importance of the Independent Monitor in the city has never been in doubt, especially
not for Jennifer Fratello, DIM’s policy director. “There is a clear need for oversight when there
isn’t a Monitor or any other agency playing that role. The ability of internal affairs departments
to conduct their own investigations, to be free of bias, and to remove themselves from the culture
in which they operate is difficult.”12 Instead of trusting the internal process, DIM hopes that
communities most affected by policing will trust them to investigate objectively since they are
separated from the police department itself. Institutions of police oversight are not implemented
to merely replace a system that people distrust, but to capitalize on the distrust that is evident in
the system, and reform it in order to increase public confidence. The DIM and organizations like
it do not exist in a binary between trust and distrust, but instead utilize distrust in the police to
increase trust in the institution of oversight. In public oversight, trust and distrust do not exist
separately, but instead exist together in a mutually beneficial dialectic.
The Monitor investigates complaints of people who experienced poor treatment at the
hands of the police, as well as complaints of the incarcerated. They work both with the DPD and
Sheriff’s office. This helps the Monitor expand their reach to the most vulnerable and least
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trusting of communities, the incarcerated. The Monitor makes recommendations to the law
enforcement agencies for improvements. Recent recommendations for the county jails included,
“making grievance forms more accessible, having them in Spanish as well as in English, and
putting them in a direct phone line from the jail to the DIM. If you are an inmate and you have a
complaint against the deputy in your pod, you can’t fill out a grievance and hand it to him. When
people are controlling your freedom, you can’t trust them to essentially turn themselves in. If
there’s a direct line to us, people are more likely to come forward,” Fratello says.
The intent of the DIM was to ease tensions after the police killing of Paul Childs. Since
his murder in 2003, there have been more many highly publicized cases in the city. In 2004, a
man was shot when police mistook a Pepsi can on his nightstand to be a gun; in 2009, Michael
DeHerrara was beaten by a police officer for not ending a call on his cell phone; also in 2009,
Alex Landau was beaten by the police during a traffic stop; and most recently, unarmed 17-yearold girl Jessie Hernandez was shot in a car by police officers. That case is still under
investigation.
The Denver Independent Monitor was created in the early 2000’s in response to highprofile officer-involved shootings. The continuation of high-profile police killings in the city
may provide evidence that the DIM method of public oversight is not working, either. Fratello
maintains that a primary responsibility of the Monitor is to make recommendations to law
enforcement agencies in the Denver metro area. Although their recommendations are not
binding, Fratello says they are often used to make changes in the departments. These
recommendations, largely voluntary and neither mandatory nor enforced, have the appearance of
a window dressing. If the city’s system of police oversight does not work to change officer
behavior, evidenced by the continuation of officer-involved shootings after the implementation
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of the DIM, is the system a failure? Instead of dismissing public oversight as a means to demand
accountability and transparency, alternative means of oversight should be explored as a way to
ensure the intentions of the review boards are achieved.
Bakersfield / Kern County, CA
Kern County, California is notable for several reasons. The area was a major destination
for displaced farmers in the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, a journey made famous by the Joad family
in John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath. One of the county’s towns is Delano, made famous as
the epicenter of the United Farmworkers Union of the 1960s and 1970s. It was here that Dolores
Huerta and Cesar Chavez led national strikes against grape and lettuce growers to raise
awareness of the plight of Mexican-American and Filipino farmworkers. Later, “The Bakersfield
Sound” emerged, a distinct brand of country music that became well-known for the blue-collar
themes and innovations on the electric guitar of musicians like Merle Haggard and Dwight
Yoakam.
The county was made famous again in late 2015, when The Guardian released a report on
police killings, naming Kern County the deadliest county in the United States for police
shootings. In 2015 alone, out of a population of less than 900,000, 13 people were killed by the
police there. “During the same period, 9 people were killed by the NYPD across the five counties
of New York City, where almost 10 times as many people live, and about 23 times as many
sworn law enforcement officers patrol” (Swaine & Laughland 2015). Locals know Kern County
as a place where the law enforcement is volatile and “not to be messed with.”13 Of the
Bakersfield police and Kern County Sheriff departments, an activist warns, “They are known as,
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‘shoot now, ask questions later,’ kind of guys. If you don’t comply, you might get three warning
shots in the back.”14 Cynicism of the police force is common, and the names of highly publicized
victims of police murder are at the forefront of the conversation: David Silva, James de la Rosa,
and Jorge Ramirez.
Similar to Memphis, Bakersfield and Kern County have a racial and class divide that
separates experiences, and reveals cleavages in public trust of the police. A major destination for
Okie migration during the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, Bakersfield remains a lower-income town.
The area’s major industry is in energy; fluctuations in the oil market affects its workers, many of
whom are already low-income wage earners. “Unemployment now stands at 9.2%, significantly
higher than California’s 6.3% average and the national 5.5%. The $54,265 median income of
Bakersfield households is down 12% and one in five Bakersfield families live below the $23,050
poverty line” (Swaine & Laughland 2015). Unlike Memphis, the largest minority group is
Latinos; more recent population growth has changed the racial makeup of the area. “After rapid
growth in Bakersfield’s population during the past decade, 46% of residents are Hispanic, 38%
white, and 8% African American. Yet internal statistics show 74% of the roughly 390 sworn
officers of Bakersfield police department are white, with only 21% Hispanic and less than 5%
African American” (Swaine & Laughland 2015).
Joey Williams, lead organizer for Faith in Action Kern County, has like many other men
of color in the area, had several run ins with the police. “When I was 21, I was beaten by
detention officers in the county jail, and at 15, in the county, the cops pushed my face into the
dirt and had me eat gravel, looking for a weapon I didn’t have. So even from 15 years old, I’ve
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had personal experience with the law enforcement. This kind of thing is very common here,
especially among people of color and poor people.” Williams maintains that poor whites have
similar experiences as people of color, and that police harassment is an almost daily occurrence,
leading to distrust towards the police.
Despite demands from families of victims, community organizations, and international
media attention, there is no system of police oversight in Kern County. The internal affairs
processes are not public, and all proceedings are kept within the police departments. “A review
by the Guardian identified 54 fatal shootings over the past decade by Bakersfield police and
Kern County sheriff’s deputies. At least 49 of the 54 were publicly ruled justified by panels of
senior officers from the same department as the officers who fired” (Swaine & Laughland 2015).
Williams maintains that the police department’s findings in their internal investigations display a
lack of accountability and transparency to the public, which is a major concern affecting public
trust of the police. He says, “They can’t keep investigating themselves, because it’s not impartial.
Of course it’s not impartial! I mean, I don’t want to send my friend to jail either. It’s an obvious
conflict of interest.”
Williams speaks to a common thread that can be found when talking about oversight with
activists around the country: trust. If people have a negative experience with law enforcement
officers, they are forced to file the complaint with the same department, with officers who work
alongside the people who the complainant feels wronged them. The pervasive feeling is a
cynicism on every level of this process. “There’s no trust in the communities of color in
Bakersfield. The majority of folks won’t speak out, or even file a complaint when they need to,
because there is so much intimidation by the police department and sheriff’s office.”
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For Williams, the implementation of an oversight agency is the first step towards creating
trust in the community. “Once there is independent review and investigation, we will see a
different story. There will be another level of respect from the people for officers. But right now,
it’s just fear of being next. Once justice starts to happen, we’ll see some trust built. I don’t want
to say ‘trust restored,’ because I don’t think there has ever been a time when communities of
color and poor communities have fully trusted law enforcement. It’s really about doing things a
new way and trying to build something different.” The creation of a review board will be the first
step to building trust in the people and the public accountability of the police. In a city and
county that are beleaguered by constant criticism of the actions of public officials, an oversight
agency will be the first in a lengthy process to establish a new mentality of accountability for the
police.
Texas Civil Rights Project
Jim Harrington is an attorney and the director of the Texas Civil Rights Project (TCRP).
The organization has been instrumental in implementing several oversight agencies around the
state, and a major voice calling for the creation of oversight agencies where there are none. The
TCRP was a key player in calling for an oversight agency in San Antonio, joining other
organizations to make recommendations to the SAPD. Included in its recommendations is for the
San Antonio city government to implement an agency in the area because public trust in the
internal affairs is nonexistent. The report suggests that, “The SAPD Internal Affairs division has
so little legitimacy in the public eye that policy changes alone will not be sufficient to restore its
credibility in the eyes of the public. The City of San Antonio needs to establish an independent
police oversight board with subpoena power to take citizen complaints, ensure satisfactory
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follow-up with complainants, and – most importantly – affirmatively monitor the investigative
process and patterns of misconduct” (TCRP Report 16).
The reality of law enforcement review boards and independent monitors is that these
oversight agencies are not powerful enough to make recommendations stick; recommendations
made by most review boards are not legally binding. Harrington recognizes the pitfalls of the
current form of most boards, that they may be unable to bring change to police departments due
to their lack of power. “I am of the view that review boards don’t work. They are not truly
independent from the police system; they don’t know what they can do and they don’t have any
power. In order to truly be effective, review boards have to be able to hold supervisors
accountable, and none of them do.”15 Because it’s widely believed that issues of accountability
and transparency in police departments are systemic and an inherent part of the departments’
culture, recommendations are voluntary, and some believe that police implement a few changes
to departments as a means to ease anger in the community.
Harrington’s assessment of the police system implies that trust in the police is so low that
law enforcement review boards are unable to create the changes for which they are intended. Due
to the ineffectiveness of the boards and combined with the “cultures of excessive killings” in the
police departments, public trust is nil. “Review boards do not affect trust, because the public has
the same jaded view that I do of the police,” he says. Because the current system leaves review
board without effective authority over supervisors in the police departments, oversight agencies
will provide a “window dressing” solution, which does not have strong enough powers to
promote lasting changes in the police culture.
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In Austin, the Texas state capital, the community demanded a review board, and
eventually the Department of Justice went to Austin to implement the monitor, making many
changes to the police’s process. For Harrington, because the current systems are unable to
effectively target police supervisors who create and maintain the culture of their departments, it
is up to elites like police chiefs and supervisors to truly force change. “The most effective thing
to happen was when the Department of Justice came to the Austin PD and made 165 changes to
the department. We had a new chief at the time [Art Acevado], who was willing to make
changes. But, he is just one person, and it remains to be seen if the changes will affect the
systemic problems in the department.”
The US Department of Justice completed a four-year investigation into the Austin Police
Department in 2011 (George, 2011), concluding that the department had implemented most of
the recommendations the DOJ made in 2007 when they initially arrived in the city. The Texas
Civil Rights Project and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) were two of the organizations calling for the investigation in 2007, filing a federal
civil rights complaint. The final recommendations to the local police department were “the early
identification of officers with a tendency to violate use-of-force policies and scrutiny of the
department’s internal affairs process by the police monitor’s office” (George, 2011). Harrington
believes that the changes made by Police Chief Acevedo at the behest of the DOJ have been the
most forceful agents for change in the city’s police culture. “Community-police relations are
better, but that has nothing to do with the review board, it has to do with the police chief. He has
been committed to community accessibility, and that has done the most to affect change in the
city, along with the 165 changes from the DOJ.”16 One of the most effective recommendations
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from the federal government was the cessation of consent searches at police stops, which
Harrington says targeted communities of color and led to perceptions of arbitrariness of police
power. “The ‘consent’ in ‘consent searches’ proved to a misnomer because there was no real
consent there, nobody had the ability to say no to a search.”17
Summary
In conversations with activists around the country, it becomes clear that police
departments are ineffective at investigating the complaints against and wrongdoing of officers on
the force. Some activists believe the review boards do create trust, because people have more
confidence in reporting issues with police officers, and others believe that the system is not
strong enough to create trust that is not there. While there is a need for police oversight and
increased community trust in police, review boards haven’t proven to be the panacea they were
intended to be.
An overriding theme in interviews is the clear need for stronger powers of civilian
oversight to pressure police departments. Lacking effective authority to bring individual officers
to justice, the myth of the “bad apples” is permitted to continue, without handling the systemic
issues of transparency and accountability within police departments. In an opinion piece in the
New York Times, Vincent Warren, the executive director of the Center for Constitutional Rights,
explains, “More officers should be held accountable for killing unarmed young men, but it isn’t a
few bad apples, it’s the way that police are trained to see communities of color as war zones and
to behave like occupying forces” (Warren 2014). The myth of the bad apple assumes that officers
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involved in shootings or other forms of misconduct act alone, and are not representative of the
police department or criminal justice system.
The expectations of the interviewees are staggered. In cities lacking public oversight of
the police, expectations for what the review boards can accomplish are high. The institutions as
they remain in these cities are ineffective at addressing issues of complaints and efficacy.
However, because there is no institutionalized oversight board either, supporters of oversight
boards hope that they will be more effective that they have proven to be in other cities. In the
cities with institutionalized public oversight, expectations of the board’s power are lower, and
cynicism around what the boards can really accomplish is much stronger.
For example, in Denver, the city’s Independent Monitor was created by city government
officials in 2004 and implemented in 2005, yet some of the most noteworthy cases of officerinvolved shootings have happened in that city. Responding to the officer-involved shooting of
unarmed 17-year-old Jessie Hernandez who was behind the wheel of a vehicle, the Denver
Police Department announced that it had changed its directives to officers with regard to suspects
in cars. “Where this was a recommendation, now it’s a directive. We want the first reaction to be
get out of the way rather than pull your firearm” (Phillips, 2015), Police Chief Robert White said
regarding the new policy. While the DIM announced it would evaluate the policy, no
recommendations have been announced or publicized. This change to policy occurred without
the DIM, and the incidents continue to happen although it continues to investigate. If oversight
boards’ success is measured by cessation of officer-involved shootings and complaints against
them, the system in Denver is not successful.
If review boards prove unsuccessful, what is to be done to hold police accountable?
Review boards should be publicly forceful, and must be able to compel action in law
43

enforcement institutions. As most review boards do not have the ability to take legal action
against officers involved in shootings or assault of civilians, they will most likely continue to be
ineffective. The hopes and expectations of activists in cities lacking any public oversight at all
should push for more forceful policies, including legal subpoena power to force compliance, and
work to publicize their recommendations. According to some, public actions of individuals such
as police chiefs and superiors are the most effective in convincing the community that reforms
are occurring, which will inspire trust. At the very least, activists and proponents of review
boards should also push for the public acceptance and cooperation of public officials including
law enforcement’s top brass. “The public is always going to be more interested in seeing
effective action by the city government and the police chief than a review board.”18
Based on the experiences with each interviewee, I do not believe that law enforcement
review boards can be effective in their intended functions. The highest expectations for their
potential effectiveness are in cities lacking any institutionalized oversight. In terms of
perceptions of efficacy, this pattern is especially acute. The institutional reform of review boards
is intended to change government and public trust. However, because the perceptions of efficacy
held by activists are highest in cities without public oversight, the reality of review boards is that
they are less efficacious in practice than in theory.
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CLERB: Survey Experiment
Sample
Interviews with activists around the country speak to the context for creating law
enforcement review boards. The intentions of community actors in pushing for public oversight
of the police include increasing police accountability in order to promote trust. The activists,
especially those who work in communities without institutionalized oversight, maintain that
public perceptions of the police are incredibly cynical, and public oversight of the police is the
first step to rebuilding or creating trust where it does not currently exist. Activists who are
working with families of the victims of police shootings are instrumental in creating the narrative
of cohesion in the community around distrust in the police.
Seasoned activists like Harrington in Texas, while supportive of public oversight of the
police, criticize the inability of review boards in effectively holding police accountable, in
particular administration and managers. Because the court systems often side with the police in
trials and indictments, Harrington says that a reform of the complaint system will not reform
police systems, but create a single step giving the impression of reform. He warns against
emphasizing the changes review boards will bring; due to their failings, he says review boards
will not be effective in fulfilling their intentions.
Narratives by activists for police accountability and those who serve on review boards are
strong, and serve to strengthen the case for public oversight of the police. This population,
activists and review board members, is not representative of the general population. According to
the extant literature, people who know more about government, who seek out information and
participate more regularly than the general public, are more trusting of the government and
believe they have an effect on it. However, public oversight does not seek to bolster the trust of
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activists. Systems of oversight seek to improve community-police relations two ways; review
boards seek to increase trust in the law enforcement system by giving people means to report
officer misconduct alternative to internal affairs departments. An ancillary goal of review boards
is to compel police officers to forego any action that can be perceived as misconduct or excessive
use of force. Because investigations are no longer undertaken by other officers within the police
department, the expectation for supporters of oversight is that people will feel more comfortable
in reporting misconduct.
With the narratives of why public oversight is necessary in mind, I seek to know whether
the review boards work to affect people’s levels of trust in the police. In other words, do they
work? To test whether having a review board affects political trust and perceptions of efficacy, I
fielded a survey experiment in university political science classes.19
Experimental Design
The experiment is designed to observe the differences between those who are not aware
of a law enforcement review board in their town, and those who are made aware of its presence
in the treatment. In this way, the experiment intended to observe any effects awareness of a
review board may have on one’s trust. The experiment was fielded to assess whether exposure to
a law enforcement review board in their town would affect levels of trust and perceptions of
efficacy in government, and was administered using a simulated newspaper article about an
incident leading to complaints of excessive force. All respondents were asked to read a
newspaper article that was created for the experiment, informed by local and national news
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without the missing information in these few surveys.
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stories of officer misconduct. The story is about two Memphis police officers who were “facing
allegations of excessive force” due to an incident at a traffic stop. In the control article, two
young men accuse the officers of excessive force, and their families are calling for the city to
investigate the event. Although I suspected race to have an influence on people’s perspectives on
police, the races of the complainants and police officers in the news story were excluded to avoid
leading participants to anticipate racial tensions as a main source of the incident.
In the control group, respondents read assurances from a police spokesperson who
pledges to investigate the complaint internally. In this version of the article, there is no mention
of a review board, though the young men’s families call for an increase in police accountability.
An activist calls excessive force in the MPD a city-wide issue, saying, “If this was just a question
of bad apples and not a systemic problem, you would have run out of cops to indict by now.” In
the treatment group, respondents were exposed to information about the city’s Civilian Law
Enforcement Review Board (CLERB)20.

Figure 1: Control Group Newspaper Article
20

CLERB was passed by the Memphis City Council on November 5, 2015. At time of writing, the board
has yet to be fully implemented, or to begin investigating complaints against MPD officers.
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Building on the control article, the treatment explicitly appeals to CLERB to investigate
the complaint. Instead of a police spokesperson, the treatment includes assurances from a review
board member who states the review board will ensure all parties get justice. The treatment
article also gives more information on what CLERB does - “CLERB investigates complaints of
officer misconduct including excessive and deadly force.” The purpose of this experiment is to
evaluate whether the presence of a law enforcement review board affects trust in the government
and police department, and perceptions of political efficacy.

Figure 2: Treatment Group Newspaper Article
This study was conducted amidst the Black Lives Matter movement that occurred in the
wake of a number of perceived injustices involving police officers shooting unarmed citizens.
Thus, I expected race to play a key moderating role in my results. Half of total respondents were
white, the majority of non-white respondents were African-American, and the representation of
other non-white minorities was quite low. A consideration for future research should be
capturing a generalized sample of the total population, which would better assess attitudes
throughout a whole municipality. Because racial implications were expected, I created several
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variables to assess the differing experiences and perspectives of people of color, and black
respondents in particular.
Trust measures were modeled after the American National Election Studies (ANES),
because they have been tested for many years. The questions on trust ask respondents how often
they “feel they can trust their local government and police departments to do what is right,” and
responses range from never to always on a four-point scale.
Respondents were asked whether they would report excessive force if they were to
experience it, and their responses were scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 being “no” or “don’t know,”
and 1 being “yes.” These questions are designed to assess respondents’ attitudes on the police,
more specifically to see if awareness of a law enforcement review board affects trust. The key
dependent variable in the study are respondents’ views of the police. One of the survey’s
questions asks about police trust directly: “How much of the time do you think you can trust
your local police department to do what is right?” Respondents’ trust is measured on a four-point
scale – 0 being never, 1 being only some of the time, 2 being most of the time, and 3 for just
about always.
Results
The experiment’s results seem to agree with the ultimate findings of the study’s
interviews, that review boards do not impact trust in the government or the police. The means of
trust were not radically changed from respondents being exposed to the treatment. The results are
mixed, perceptions of efficacy were altered with the treatment, but the effect is actually a
decrease, which may contradict the expected effect. However, to the question of whether
respondents would report experiencing excessive force by a police officer, the effect supports the
study’s hypothesis. The varied effects of the experiment suggest that review boards do not affect
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trust but may alter perceptions of efficacy that were not initially hypothesized, but were
intimated through interviews with activists.
There was no measurable effect of the treatment in trust in government for the entire
sample (Control M= 1.40, Std. Dev.= .65; Treated M= 1.41, Std. Dev.= .65, p=.87)21, for racial
and ethnic minorities (Control M= 1.29, Std. Dev.= .70; Treated M= 1.16, Std. Dev.= .65,
p=.46), or for black respondents (Control M=1.22, Std. Dev.= .69; Treated M= 1.16, Std. Dev.=
.63, p= .69). Trust in local government was not statistically altered by the treatment, and the null
hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected.
Trust in police was equally unaltered by the treatment. There was no large shift in trust
for police with the treatment for the entire sample (Control M= 1.66, Std. Dev.= .67; Treated M=
1.73, Std. Dev.= .70, p= .46), for racial and ethnic minorities (Control M= 1.42, Std. Dev.= .64;
Treated M= 1.30, Std. Dev.= .59, p= .32), or for black respondents (Control M= 1.32, Std. Dev.=
.61; Treated M= 1.22, Std. Dev.= .55, p= .48). Based on these results, trust in local government
was not statistically altered by the treatment, and the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
For each variable, the expected effect was that the mean would increase between the
control and treatment group, reflecting an increase in trust from being exposed to the experiment.
When respondents were asked if they would report it if they were a victim of excessive force by
an officer, exposure to the treatment did increase the likelihood of reporting. The treatment had a
positive effect, altering the perceptions for racial and ethnic minorities (Control M= .73, Std.
Dev.= .45; Treated M= .86, Std. Dev.= .35, p=.11)22. Interestingly, the treatment had a
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The first mean and standard deviation gives the study’s control group, and the second set shows the
treatment effect.
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The two-tailed p value is .1125, and the one-tailed value is .0563.
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significant effect only for this group, and had no discernable effect on white respondents
(Control M= .83, Std. Dev.= .38; Treated M= .84, Std. Dev.= .37, p= .87).
This means that for respondents who received the treatment, they were more likely to
report excessive force as a result of the treatment. This finding is momentous because reporting
experiencing excessive force is an action that exhibits trust. Individuals who have a complaint to
make against a police officer may feel afraid of retribution, of intimidation, or of hopelessness
that their complaint will not be taken seriously when it is investigated only by the police
department’s internal affairs. However, for people who were exposed to the experiment’s
treatment, they are more likely to report an incident. For systems of government to function,
people have to trust that the system will not be arbitrary, and the presence of a review board
appears to increase people’s perceptions of the complaint system.
Normatively, this result shows that after the treatment, people of color are more likely to
report experiencing excessive force to a review board. This is an important finding, because
people of color (Latinos, African-Americans, Native Americans, and Middle Easterners) are the
groups who are expected to benefit most from independent civilian oversight. While the
treatment effect was not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis, the change in means is
strong enough to show a change in likelihood of reporting excessive force, which is exciting for
the purpose of this study.
Perceptions of efficacy reveal the most surprising results of the experiment. The question
for respondents was, “How much can people like you affect what your local government does? A
great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all?” The treatment did have an effect on
efficacy. For the total sample, the null hypothesis can be rejected (Control M= 1.78, Std. Dev.=
1.09; Treatment M= 1.47, Std. Dev.= 1.21, p= .04). Interestingly, when race is incorporated, the
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results become more concentrated. The treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on
white respondents (Control M= 3.39, Std. Dev.= 1.07; Treated M= 3.19, Std. Dev.= 1.03, p=
.30). For racial and ethnic minorities, the treatment did have an effect (Control M= 3.76, Std.
Dev.= .17; Treated M= 3.07, Std. Dev.= .19, p= .02). The treatment also had a statistically
significant effect on black respondents to the survey (Control M= 3.76, Std. Dev.= 1.11; Treated
M= 3.03, Std. Dev.= 1.26, p= 0.01).
The surprising result of the efficacy variable is that, as seen in the groups’ means,
people’s perceptions of efficacy actually decrease with the treatment effect. In the treatment
group, hearing about government oversight of the police left respondents less likely to report
feeling they have an effect on government. For racial and ethnic minorities, the means for the
control and treatment groups were over 3.0, while the total group’s means were near 1.50, which
shows that minority respondents have higher perceptions of government efficacy than the general
population. The means for these groups decrease as a reaction to the treatment.
One of the indications of the experiment’s treatment strength is the manipulation check
embedded in the experiment itself. I asked all respondents whether Memphis had a law
enforcement review board, because respondents who were exposed to the treatment should have
responded that it does. In the treatment article, CLERB is identified as the city’s review board,
and its purpose, investigating complaints of officer misconduct, including excessive and deadly
force, is explicitly stated. The manipulation check showed that respondents in the treatment
group did know there was a review board in Memphis more (Control M= 1.76, Std. Dev.= .039;
Treated M= 1.65, Std. Dev.= .044, p= .06). This finding demonstrates the treatment group was
much more aware of Memphis’ review board, so the experiment did have an effect on the
respondents’ awareness.
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Figure 3: Comparing Control and Treatment Group Means between Control and
Treatment Groups
Why would the treatment undermine perceptions of efficacy? Efficacy may be unaltered
due to the treatment news article. Perhaps respondents receiving the treatment were unable to
deduce the difference in CLERB investigating the incident over the police’s internal affairs
department. In the newspaper, after an impassioned activist decries the perspective that the two
officers are “bad apples,” the article states that many officers have been indicted on misconduct
charges recently, “including 20 cops in one year.” This excerpt was taken from a Memphis Daily
News story23 during the 2015 negotiations for a new law enforcement review board, and may
have inadvertently given the impression that CLERB, already a functioning government
institution, was ineffective and not successful at bringing officers accused of misconduct to
justice.
The argument in the treatment, made during the effort for a new review board, was
effective in establishing the need for civilian oversight, but that was in the absence of a review
board. Since respondents believed CLERB did already exist and promised to investigate this new
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claim, the argument gave the impression that the review board was ineffective, given that 20
officers were indicted on charges of misconduct in a single year. While it appears that people of
color trust government and the police less, further research is needed to find out what is driving
that difference. In this study, police accountability institutions like review boards and perceptions
of government efficacy appear to be related, but the reasons why remain to be understood.
Prior to reading the newspaper article, all respondents, in both control and treatment
groups, were asked, “How interested are you in local politics?” This stimulus was utilized to
ensure that people who are more interested were not represented in a single group in the
experiment. The responses to the stimulus question range from not at all interested to very
interested. Respondents in the control group were slightly more interested in local politics than
the treatment group (Control M= 2.73, Std. Dev.= .941; Treated M= 2.47, Std. Dev. 1.11, p=
.04). To make sure disparities in political interest did not affect the study’s results, I ran
robustness checks where I controlled for interest using regression models. I got the same effects
between control and treatment groups, which verified the randomization failure did not have an
effect on the results.24
Agencies of public oversight may not appear to affect trust in government or police, but
many scholars challenge that trust levels are much different by groups in the population.
Differences in racial perspectives of government trust were revealed in the experiment as well.25
In the total sample, over half of which is comprised of white respondents, the differences
between control and treatment groups are very similar; the majority of respondents are “only
some of the time,” and, “most of the time.” In responses for racial and ethnic minorities, which
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includes black and Latino respondents, Middle Eastern/Arab and Native American respondents,
the variance in responses are nearly opposite from white respondents. White respondents mostly
answered “most of the time.” For racial minorities, the responses for responses “only some of the
time” and “most of the time” are nearly opposite from white respondents, and with a much larger
number of respondents responding 0, “never.” The differences between white and black
respondents are also striking; for black respondents, much more respondents chose “never,” and
“only some of the time” as well.
What about the police? The extant literature insists in racial division in trust, particularly
in law enforcement, citing historical discrimination, disproportionate arrests owing to the
policies of the War on Drugs, and mass incarceration, particularly of black men. Differences in
racial perspectives are also clear for trust in the police, and are similar to perspectives of trust in
government. In the total sample, the majority of responses in both control and treatment groups
show that the aggregate trusts the police more than the government; the most common response
in both groups are “most of the time,” and far more respondents report trusting police to do what
is right “just about always” (3) than “never” (0).
Differences in responses are clear for racial and ethnic minorities in general, and
particularly in black respondents. While white respondents do not report never trusting the
police, both minorities in general and black respondents have respondents who responded that
they never trust the police to do what is right. The most striking differences for minorities and
black respondents are in the middle range, “only some of the time” (1) and, “most of the time”
(2). For white respondents, the vast majority reported trusting police at least most of the time.
The variance in responses for racial and ethnic minorities is nearly a mirror image from white
respondents. The same pattern is displayed in black respondents as the major differences in black
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respondents is the vast majority reporting that they trust police “only some of the time,” and very
few saying, “just about always.”
Subsequent questions determining perspectives on the police asked respondents how
frequently the police force protects civilians, and whether they would receive justice if they
became victims of excessive force from a police officer. These two variables are concerned with
trust in the police department, and trust in the complaint system, typically controlled by the
internal affairs division of the police. The total sample showed that regardless of receiving the
experiment control or treatment, respondents largely believe the police force protects civilians, at
least some of the time (1), but mostly most of the time (2), and just about always (3).
The persistent trend in divisions in trust along racial line persists in responses to whether
the police protect civilians. For racial and ethnic minorities, the police are still believed to trust
civilians most of the time (2) most often, but the amount of people responding, “just about
always” (3), is much smaller for minority respondents. While black respondents agree generally
that the police protect civilians, much more respondents said “only some of the time” (1), and far
less responded that police protect just about always. These differences in responses reveal an
important finding, that the divergent experiences with police for people of color in general, and
particularly for African-Americans in the US.
Whereas respondents largely believe the police protect civilians, they were much less
likely to believe that they would get justice if they were to experience excessive force. The most
common response is only some of the time (1), with respondents who also believe that they
would never receive justice (0). This is unexpected, because the inquiry on receiving justice was
intended to provide more evidence for general trust in the police. I expected that trust in the
police would mirror the confidence respondents would have in receiving justice if they
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experienced excessive force. This is a noteworthy finding, because it suggests that people trust
the police in theory, but not necessarily in practice. Perhaps general trust in the police brings up
different feelings for people than a more pointed question on interacting with the police. People
may trust the institution of law enforcement to do what is right most of the time, but not that
individual officers will be brought to justice for misconduct. Asking whether you would get
justice for experiencing excessive force may bring to the surface memories of negative
experiences with police, like being pulled over, receiving a ticket, or even experiencing
excessive force from an officer.
Divergences in respondents by race are less dramatic than for other questions on the
police. The key difference between white respondents and racial and ethnic minorities and black
respondents is that responses for minorities are not as concentrated on the high end of the scale;
many more respondents responded that they would get justice most of the time (2) or just about
always (3). Histograms for racial and ethnic minorities and just black respondents are almost
identical. Both groups largely believe they would receive justice only some of the time (1).
Divergent responses illustrate the differences in experiences with police for people of
color and white respondents. In many of the study’s variables, responses by people of color are
mirrored opposites of white respondents. For questions probing trust in government, trust in the
police, whether the respondents believe the police force protects civilians, and whether the
respondent believes they would get justice if they experienced excessive force from a police
officer, racial differences are clear and troubling. The discrepancies between white respondents
and racial and ethnic minorities were expected due to the accounts found in the extant literature
and in activist interviews. The differences in responses to the experiment’s questions are
indicative of the problems broached in the literature review and in interviews with activists.
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Disparities in perspectives of local government and police along racial lines are a definite
obstruction in the intentions of law enforcement review boards, and it is doubtful that
implementing a review board would be able to repair the cleavages. The scope of actions that
review boards have available may frankly be too weak to affect real change in the behavior of
police departments by encouraging stronger accountability. Without public accountability,
perceptions of trust are unlikely to change.
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Conclusions
With this study, I sought to see whether law enforcement review boards affect
perceptions of trust in government. As it turns out, they may not have a strong effect on the
perceptions of trust people hold of government or the police. In the treatment group newspaper
article, immediately after the function of review boards is described, respondents read a quote
from activist Tina Smith. In the article, she “says excessive force is a city-wide issue. ‘If this was
just a question of bad apples and not a systemic problem, you would have run out of cops to
indict by now.’” This passionate quote from a community activist was intended to dissuade the
reader of the police department’s ability to investigate itself, and to reinforce the need for the
review board.
However, perhaps when respondents read the article, they assumed that because the
Civilian Law Enforcement Review Board (CLERB) exists in the city, it is ineffective because the
problem of complaints against officers persists. That may point to an unsuccessful review board.
The presence of a review board decreasing perceptions of efficacy makes sense as perceptions of
review boards’ efficacy also decreases after their implementation in the interviews. Activists in
cities without review boards push for their implementation, and expect that they will help relieve
distrust in the police by building trust in the board’s processes. Activists in cities with
institutionalized review boards have seen what they are actually capable of, and are less hopeful
of review boards changing perceptions of efficacy, because they are ultimately ineffective.
Even so, as an example of the possibilities of institutional reform on influencing trust,
law enforcement review boards may fall flat. Can institutional reforms increase political trust? It
does not appear that they can. However, the matters of police accountability and law
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enforcement review boards are extremely relevant to contemporary national narratives, and
future research should consider several remaining questions.
The normative implications of this study are multifaceted. First, the survey experiment
reveals that for most aspects studied, it is unclear whether the presence of review boards actually
affects people’s trust and perceptions of efficacy in local government or the police. Conversely,
it is clear that different racial and ethnic groups feel vastly different about local government and
police in general. The differences in means for racial and ethnic groups in governmental trust and
trust in the police leave many questions and show that this topic merits further research.
Due to the variety in experiment results, contrasting with the expectations given by extant
literature, and the expectations of many of the activists interviewed, further research is justifiable
and necessary. Activists in Bakersfield, CA and Memphis, TN, who at time of the interview were
engaged in public campaigns to create a system of public oversight, had the highest expectations
for oversight boards. In these cities, review boards are hoped to “help mend some of the
damaged public confidence in police departments, and thereby act as a way to restore some of
the public confidence in the department’s ability to handle complaints.”26
In each of the interviews with activists and public officials, review boards are seen as the
first step towards accountability, and not as the final means to creating trust in the police and
increasing perceptions of efficacy in government. Public officials, serving on an oversight board
and an attorney familiar with processes throughout their state, had more tempered expectation for
review boards’ effectiveness. According to one interviewee, review boards cannot affect change

26

Interview with Paul Garner, Memphis, TN. 2015.
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because they lack power to bring changes in a city, “because it is such a weak institution. It just
doesn’t have the force or power to affect change on a large scale.”27
A major theme in this study’s interviews is that review boards are the initial step towards
accountability, but government and law enforcement supervisors and officials have to make sure
the department is complying. Public engagement by police chiefs, the federal Department of
Justice, and local mayors serves to create trust in the public by affecting perceptions of the law
enforcement organizations. Perhaps, due to the varied experiences in each city and the differing
levels of assistance or barriers by the supervisors in law enforcement organizations, expectations
possible effects that review boards have on trust and perceptions of efficacy should be more
measured.

27

Interview with Jim Harrington, Austin, TX. 2015.
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Appendix
I.

Treatment: Simulated Newspaper Articles

Control Group – no treatment (no
review board present in article), police
investigating complaints against the
officers internally

II.

Treatment Group – Civilian Law
Enforcement Review Board
investigating complaints against MPD
officers

Survey Sample: Demographics
Despite the use of a student sample, the data show quite a lot of variation in demographics. The

age range of students was 17 to 59 with the vast majority of respondents at the lower end of the data;
respondents below age 30 comprised nearly all (218) of the total 237 survey respondents. The income

level of respondents was also varied in range, but was much more varied. Households making
less than $40,000, working class respondents, comprised 73 of the 237 total surveys; middle
class respondents in the middle of the socio-economic class spectrum were 49 of total
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respondents, and respondents from wealthier households whose total incomes were above
$70,000 per year were 90 of the total respondents.
III.

Racial Differences in Survey Questions
Histograms created in Stata. Data separated into 2 groups: 0 and 1. Variables I – IV (trust

in government, trust in police, police protecting civilians, and would you get justice) are scaled
0-3. The four responses for all four variables were 0: never, 1: only some of the time, 2: most of
the time, and 3: just about always. The y-axis in Stata histograms do not reflect the frequency of
respondents choosing the answer option. Instead, the y-axis measures the probability density of
choosing the response.
i.

Trust in Government

Trust in Government: Total Group of Survey Respondents in Control (0) and Treatment (1)
Groups
1

0

1

Density

2

3

0

0
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2

3

trustgov
Graphs by survey
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Trust in Government: White Respondents (0), versus Racial and Ethnic Minorities (1).
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Trust in Government: White Respondents (0), versus Black Respondents (1).
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Trust in the Police
Trust in Local Police Department: Total Group of Survey Respondents in Control (0)
and Treatment (1) Groups
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Trust in Local Police Department: White Respondents (0), versus Racial and Ethnic Minorities
(1).
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Trust in Local Police Department: White Respondents (0), versus Black Respondents (1).
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Do police protect civilians?
Police Protecting Civilians: Total Group of Survey Respondents in Control (0) and
Treatment (1) Groups
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Police Protecting Civilians: White Respondents (0), versus Racial and Ethnic Minorities
(1).
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Police Protecting Civilians: White Respondents (0), versus Black Respondents (1).
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iv.

If you reported excessive force, would you get justice?
Would You Get Justice?: Total Group of Survey Respondents in Control (0) and
Treatment (1) Groups
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Would You Get Justice?: White Respondents (0), versus Racial and Ethnic Minorities (1).

Would You Get Justice?: White Respondents (0), versus Black Respondents (1).

IV.

Manipulation Check
The question to check for understanding is, “Does Memphis have a law enforcement
review board?” The question is a check on the treatment, because respondents who have
been exposed to the experiment’s treatment should know that Memphis does have a
review board, since CLERB is mentioned throughout the article, with a short explanation
of what the board does. The check is coded dichotomously to reflect a right or wrong
answer. Below, the responses are shown as 0 and 1, “No” and “Don’t know” being 0, and
“Yes” being 1. While the treatment group was more likely to answer correctly, and
respondents were less likely to respond “No” or “Don’t know,” the treated group was not
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all aware of Memphis’ CLERB (Control M= 0.24, Std. Dev.= .429; Treated M= 0.35,
Std. Dev.= .479, p= .06).
Does Memphis Have a Law Enforcement Review Board?: Total Group of Respondents in
Control (0) and Treatement (1) Groups
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V.

Stimulus Question

The stimulus question which precedes the treatment in the experiment is included
to ensure that respondents who are more interested in local politics are not grouped
together in the control (0) or treatment (1) group. The question, “How interested are
you in local politics?” is scaled 0 to 4, “Not at all interested” being 0, “Somewhat
uninterested” being 1, “Neutral” being 2, “Somewhat interested” being 3, and “Very
interested” being 4. The control group is slightly more interested than the treatment
group (Control M= 2.73, Std. Dev.= .941; Treated M= 2.47, Std. Dev.= 1.11, p= .04).

How Interested are you in Local Politics?: Total Group of Respondents in Control (0)
and Treatement (1) Groups
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